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Disasters, particularly those triggered by nature are often followed by a swift humanitarian relief 
response to address the resultant emergencies. These efforts are then transitioned through the medium 
recovery stage, eventually aimed at providing a long term post-disaster reconstruction solution. 
Emergency humanitarian relief focuses on responding to the immediate need for restoration of basic 
services, medical treatment and medical supplies, food and temporary shelter, and is a short term 
strenuous effort. Reconstruction of permanent houses, on the other hand, is a continuous process that 
often requires decades of effort to return a community to normality. Whilst emergency relief is generally 
perceived to be very effective, post-disaster housing reconstruction projects often fail to meet their set 
objectives. This paper outlines and discusses factors that contribute to the failure of post-disaster housing 
reconstruction projects and the subsequent immediate and long term negative impacts of failure on project 
outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike most normal construction projects, post-disaster housing projects are diverse in nature, have unique 
socio-cultural and economical requirements and are extremely dynamic and thus necessitate a meaningful 
and dynamic response 1). Post-disaster reconstruction practices that lack a strategy  compatible with,  the 
severity of disaster, community culture and socio-economic requirements, environmental condition, 
government legislations, and technical and technological situations, frequently fail to operate and respond 
effectively to the needs of the wider affected population 2). Despite the identified need for some further 
systematic research 3), strengthened global interest amongst media, government/non-government bodies and 
academics in the area of post-disaster reconstruction and an already established requirement 4) to find ways to 
help improve the future outcomes and to contribute to enhancing the current practices employed for post-
disaster reconstruction projects 5; 6), this area continues to remain poorly researched 7). Factors that frequently 
pose real threats to the eventual success of reconstruction projects are rarely given appropriate consideration 
when designing such projects. Research into past reconstruction practices has shown that ignoring these 
factors altogether or failing to give them meaningful consideration can effect housing reconstruction projects 
meaning that they either miss their targets altogether, or undergo serious modifications after their occupancy, 
subsequently resulting in an overall loss of project resources. 
 
This paper, which forms part of a larger ongoing PhD research project, investigates briefly the nature of 
post-disaster housing reconstruction projects and touches upon the common factors that negatively impact on 
the outcome of such projects.  A comprehensive review of the extant literature was conducted to explore and 
explain some of the reasons why post-disaster reconstruction projects so often fail in meeting their 
objectives. Case studies of unsuccessful past projects from around the world are examined and factors which 
frequently lead to the failure of post-disaster reconstruction projects are determined. Resulting from the 
review of the literature, five common major factors for project failure (amongst some others) and these 
include, lack of, or problems with, community participation, relocation issues, fraudulent use and waste of 
project funds, and ignoring local needs and culture, are discussed. 
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2. POST-DISASTER HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS – FACTORS FOR 
FAILURE 
 
(1) Lack of community participation  
Case studies of past post-disaster reconstruction projects indicate that projects without a local component 
or active community involvement stand a greater chance of falling flat and destroying community cohesion 8-
14). For example, a case study of a flood rehabilitation project in Bangladesh revealed that a latrine built 
adjacent to neighbouring dwellings without prior community consultation caused severe tension among the 
neighbours 8). 
 
In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 in Aceh-Indonesia many non-governmental 
organisations outsources and tendered out what initially was to be a purely community driven effort, to large 
construction companies. The companies were non-participatory and did not pay any attention to the needs of 
the affected beneficiaries. The houses built by these companies were ultimately found to be structurally 
defective, culturally inappropriate and failed to meet the required budgetary requirements, thus building 
further tension and anger within the affected Acehnese communities. The lack of permitted community 
involvement subsequently led many families to refuse to live in the houses 15). A study by Dikmen 11) also 
revealed that hasty decisions made by government authorities, without a thorough analysis of the needs of 
the affected beneficiaries, led to great dissatisfaction with a post-disaster housing reconstruction project in 
Cankiri, Turkey.   
 
A further example of government agencies often making hasty decisions without consulting with affected 
communities, can be drawn from a case study in Sri Lanka. After the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the 
government of Sri Lanka developed a buffer-zone policy preventing building of certain structures within 
perceived tsunami extended tide reach areas without considering its socio-economic impact on affected 
communities. The policy had many practical flaws and led to delays in the recovery of affected coastal 
communities. After disrupting community life and reconstruction efforts for many months, the policy was 
subsequently amended in December 2005 to reduce the buffer-zone 16; 17).     
 
Another example of the adverse affects of excluding communities from participation in post-disaster 
reconstruction can be found in the case of Gujarat, India. After the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, a contractor-
driven method of reconstruction was adopted which did not allow affected communities to have effective 
involvement in the reconstruction process, leading to great loss of people’s historical and cultural identity 
and negative long term psycho-social consequences 18).  
 
In another Indian case in Cuddalore,  there was a perceived negative impact of the poor coordination with 
the local community; the large amount of project funding available to local and international non-
governmental organisations for recovery and reconstruction of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami-affected 
Cuddalore coast led to intense competition among the organisations involved in implementing aid.  In an 
attempt to secure their position in the relief effort and ensure their involvement in post-tsunami 
reconstruction by any means, aid organisations offered a diverse range of appealing assets to the affected 
coastal communities. This initiative was poorly coordinated, not driven by community participation, and 
exhibited a lack of awareness of the potential socio-economic, cultural and environmental impacts. This 
eventually triggered the prevailing underlying tensions that already existed in an ethnically sensitive 
environment 19).  
 
Trincomalee is a district in Sri Lanka which is situated approximately 15 kilometres from the sea. After 
the destruction of Sri Lankan coastal communities by tsunami waves in 2004, the government of Sri Lanka 
identified Kumburupiddi as a new site for building houses and for permanently relocating the affected 
fishing communities. The construction work at this site encountered two major problems: 1) the site was 
perceived to be ready for new construction, but in reality it required major pre-construction preparation 
work, and 2) there were six different international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved in 
construction programmes, each adopting diverse approaches, varying house designs and different time 
frames. This government initiative, which was implemented by INGOs without community participation, led 
to great community anxiety and delays in construction implementation. Both the new site and the design of 
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the houses to be placed upon it did not meet the socio-economic and cultural needs of the affected 
community. In December 2005, the houses were handed over to the community, however, in April 2006, 
these houses still remained unoccupied and the beneficiaries had no desire to return to live in them 17). 
 
Based on these brief caselets and on other research 20; 21), ignoring the views of affected communities 
appears to always have had negative impacts on the outcomes of reconstruction projects. In 1970 after major 
earthquakes inflicted much damage and many deaths occurred in Peru and Turkey, governments in both 
countries having no previous experience or expertise in post-disaster reconstruction, began large 
reconstruction projects, often involving relocation. Affected communities were given no opportunities to 
participate in the process of project planning and subsequent execution, which meant that houses were built 
for people without any consideration of their  specific needs and requirements 22) . A study conducted by 
Schilderman 23) revealed that after forty years these houses still stood empty and the affected communities 
went back to their familiar old ways of building to provide accommodation for themselves. 
  
A more recent example of the outcomes of disregarding community participation in post-disaster housing 
reconstruction occurred in the Australian-funded housing project “The Alice-Ghan” built 30 kilometres north 
of Kabul, Afghanistan. The intention of this project was to house forcibly deported Afghan refugees back in 
their home country of Afghanistan. All major stakeholders, such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), CARE International and the Afghan Government, had their specific roles to play 
during the early and subsequent stages of the housing project; nonetheless, the most crucial stakeholder “the 
recipient community” was excluded. The project outcomes were reported as being unsuccessful, particularly 
in terms of meeting the socio-economic and cultural needs of the recipient community 24). 
 
Kelly (2010) further reports “Like every resident spoken to, Assadullah Mohammed Yacoub, 48, says he 
is grateful to the Australian government for its assistance but wishes it had asked people what they needed 
instead of building a Western suburb in the middle of the Hindu Kush”. 
 
(2) Problems associated with community participation 
Although community participation has been acknowledged as being vital for reconstruction projects, it can 
have long term negative impacts on community development if the basic principles of community 
participation are neglected 25). Such a contrary view is expressed in a study of community participation by 
Lizarralde and Massyn 26) which concluded that in the African cities of Netreg, Freedom Park and Mfuleni, 
the community-based approach led to urban fragmentation and limited opportunities for economic growth. 
These authors 26) also argue that the overall performance of low-cost housing projects does not necessarily 
depend on community participation and that some aspects of community participation need revision.  
 
In an effort to reconstruct houses for the community affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami in December 
2004, Foundation of Goodness (FoG), a Sri Lankan local non-for-profit agency, invested substantial time and 
effort in designing two-storey houses. The design was carried out in consultation with the community and a 
model was produced before the construction work could actually begin. When initially polled, the 
community supported the building of two storey houses as they believed that the second floor would reduce 
vulnerability to future tsunami destruction and damage. However, problems started to emerge after the 
community moved in. They soon found that the kitchen did not allow for bio-fuel cooking, the stairs were 
too steep (which made it difficult for aged members to access the second floor) and there was a lack of 
outdoor space. However, that was not the major problem; what could not have been easily predicted by the 
community during the design and implementation was the excessive heat that made the second floor 
uninhabitable. In this case the community had been consulted on a regular basis, however the lack of 
technical and environmental knowledge made community participation less effective leading to great 
dissatisfaction during post-construction occupancy 16).  
 
In another Sri Lankan case, the intended recipients in New Town and Mandanai were delegated the task of 
monitoring the construction work of their houses. This practice, coupled with the lack of technical 
knowledge led many recipients to jeopardise their entitlements by abusing their role, and in some cases 
becoming trouble makers rather than contributors (Ibid 2010).  
 
Choguill 27) advocates that community control does not necessarily mean success, supporting his statement 
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by providing the example of a project, Comuneros-2, in Cali-Colombia, which was “founded in April, 1981 
the Corporación de Adjudicatarios del Valle (the "Corporación")” 28) and for which community members 
attempted to unravel their water needs, bringing the project almost to the brink of total failure. Furthermore, 
adopting a community participation approach does not always establish grounds for full community 
mobilisation. In Sri Lanka, for example, some NGOs faced enormous challenges when beneficiaries lacked 
the desire to contribute to rebuilding their own houses and villages 29).   
 
In the Maldives, in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004, the government allocated a plot of 
land to build 250 houses for an affected community. The community was invited to participate in the design 
phase of their houses. However, the government deliberately excluded them from the reconstruction process 
to avoid an over-reaction and unreasonable interference from owners excessively obsessed with the quality 
of “their” houses 30).  
 
Community participation if defined inaccurately can have a negative impact on project outcomes. This 
view is expressed by Ganapati and Ganapati 31) in a case study of the World Bank’s housing reconstruction in 
Turkey. Although information in relation to housing characteristics was received by the planners, community 
participation largely remained problematic. Two main problems in relation to the process of community 
involvement were identified. Firstly, community participation was limited to involvement of the project 
beneficiaries only. Secondly, the input from the local community was not included in the plans. Although the 
local government and community-based organisations had extensive information about local conditions and 
rich practical experiences from past disasters, their participation was limited to attending a few preliminary 
project planning meetings. This produced a narrowly defined scope based on only a facade of community 
participation and thus raised a number of concerns. One such concern resulted from the building of an 
unneeded extra school in the project area in Sirinkoy, but ignoring Saryli-Orcun where a school was actually 
required and should have formed part of the reconstruction. Project resources could have been directed to 
meeting more legitimate needs had the planners extended their views of community participation beyond 
merely including individual project recipients for limited exposure to a few secondary meetings.  
 
(3) Relocation 
Planners and developers of post-disaster reconstruction projects have the tendency to relocate and resettle 
disaster-affected communities. There is often little consideration given to the significance of ‘place’ in the 
formation of community identity and socio-cultural and economical relations 32; 33; 17). Research suggests that 
affected communities do not willingly accept relocation, which can often lead to further deprivation 23).   
 
A study of housing reconstruction by Dikmen 11) following the earthquake of June 2000 in Cankiri, Turkey 
revealed that relocating communities from their original place can be problematic. The study indicated that 
houses reconstructed in situ were fully occupied, whereas, most of those constructed on new sites that did not 
consider the lifestyle of the beneficiaries, stood empty. 
 
The earthquake that killed nearly 20,000 people and affected 7,633 out of 18,356 villages in Gujarat has 
been recorded as one of the deadliest and the most destructive earthquakes in India UNDP 34). Following the 
earthquake, the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), which was established by the state 
government, publicised its rehabilitation policy. The policy had three approaches; relocation of utterly 
destroyed villages, assistance for in-situ reconstruction of both severely damaged and of less affected 
villages and assistance for the reconstruction of houses and buildings in urban areas. A survey of three 
villages conducted in 2004 as a result of this policy approach, revealed that under the participatory approach 
90.8 per cent of the recipients expressed satisfaction. However, this level declined to 71.8 per cent when 
houses were delivered by contractors. Amongst all approaches tried, the least effective and least efficient 
approach was the donor-driven approach. This approach did not involve affected communities, failed to 
consider community needs, caused disruption to family networks, was based on relocation and satisfied only 
22.8 percent of the beneficiaries 35). 
 
Both as a result of past practice and according to contemporary studies, all agree that community 
relocation needs thorough analysis and meaningful planning because it involves more than merely relocating 
a mass of physical bodies. Relocation is a risky endeavour that can result in project failure if it involves any 
measure less than relocating the entire community life 36). In Sri Lanka in 2004, the relocation of fishing 
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communities many kilometres inland severely undermined people’s ability to access their only livelihood, 
i.e., the sea. Not only the men but also the women and children were devastated as they were no longer able 
to take up any sort of employment 29).  
 
(4) Fraud, corruption and waste of project funds  
Unlike green field construction, post-disaster reconstruction is complex, dynamic and chaotic in nature 1; 
37-39) and as such represents many challenges 40). The task of reconstruction, as indicated by Le Masurier, 
Rotimi and Wilkinson 41) and Lloyd-Jones 6) necessitates a high level of coordination and a rigorous 
managerial approach. Besides the inherent challenges such as short and inflexible deadlines, community 
mobilisation, high donor demand and maintenance of intended housing quality 40; 42), reconstruction projects 
can also fall prey to fraud and corruption resulting in huge losses of project funding 29; 43). A substantial 
amount of project resources can also be wasted on managing and alleviating tension with the host 
governments. This is evident from a case study conducted in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
2004 in Sri Lanka, where NGOs had to divert a considerable amount of their resources towards negotiating 
and restoring relationships with the government of Sri Lanka after they had become frayed due to the slow 
progress of post-disaster housing reconstruction 16).  A further example of wasted project funding is the 
delivery of thousands of unsuitable tents to the internally displaced population (IDPs) in Sri Lanka following 
the 2004 tsunami. In an attempt to temporarily house these IDPs, thousands of tents arrived from 
neighbouring towns and other countries. These tents were soon found to be of the wrong design as they were 
not suitable for the coastal climate, and thus people refused to use them 17).  
 
A more serious example of wastage of aid funding was the supply of clothing to southern India after the 
2004 tsunami; aid organisations generously sent tons of warm clothes, including thick sweaters, to one of the 
hottest places in India. The clothes severely disrupted local traffic when they were dumped on roads and also 
caused danger to livestock that tried to eat them. The resultant chaotic situation demanded a massive cleanup 
and removal operation diverting municipal personnel from the major recovery effort 6).        
 
In post-disaster operations in both Sri Lanka and in Aceh-Indonesia, many community leaders were 
perceived as constituting a major obstacle to community consultations when they failed to pass on, or 
distorted, important information. The Acehnese community also related concerns about their local leaders 
being corrupt and abusive of their leadership role. In both countries the lack of transparency and the corrupt 
nature of community leadership led to many concerns related to inequitable distribution of housing 44).   An 
examination of 23 recent case studies of post-disaster settlements by Leon et al. 45) revealed that a 1999 
transitional settlement and shelter programme in post-conflict Ingushetia, Russia, faced numerous fairness 
and equity challenges. The programme was intended to provide cash grants to host families to shelter 
displaced families in private houses. The programme suffered when individual community members 
fraudulently falsified documents in order to meet eligibility criteria for the programme.  
 
In the aftermath of large disasters, governments as well as NGO employees can become particularly 
susceptible to fraud and corruption when hasty disbursement of large sums of recovery funding and 
distribution of aid assistance is ill-coordinated and incompetently monitored 15). In Sri Lanka, after the effects 
of the tsunami in 2004, the buffer-zone policy that had already caused much anxiety to affected communities 
led to anger and aggravation when incidences of unfairness and corruption in relation to land allocation 
became public. Even after the government’s rising of buffer-zone limits, people’s right to access their 
affected land and to reconstruct their houses remained at the discretion of the Sri Lankan government, 
ultimately causing grave confusion amongst many international NGOs over whom to assist. As of August 
2007 (nearly three years after the tsunami), because of the slow progress, more than 30 families who could 
not make it back to their previous land were still waiting for their new houses to be built 46).   
 
During the tsunami recovery operations in Aceh, Indonesia, the Save the Children and Oxfam charities 
had to suspend their reconstruction projects after they realised they had fallen prey to corrupt contractors. As 
a result Save the Children lost more than USD 800,000 of its project funding when some of the building 
contracts had to be written off. Oxfam, also lost tens of thousands of dollars of aid money in Banda Aceh, 
which subsequently called for an investigation to determine the scale of corruption 6). 
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(5) Ignoring local needs/culture 
Evidence suggests that affected communities do have the ability to overcome disasters and also have the 
most extensive knowledge of their own needs. However, reconstruction is often delivered in such a way that 
at best responds to the requirements of its implementers rather than to those of the affected population 47; 16) 
and as a result,  these projects often suffer when community needs are eclipsed by the implementers’ greater 
interests such as project costs and speed 6; 46; 48; 49; 8; 47).   
 
A field investigation carried out in 2008-2009 in Chennai, India exposed flaws resulting from developers 
ignoring community culture. Some newly built apartments had toilet doors fixed next to the kitchens, which 
was considered an unhealthy arrangement. Another culturally sensitive issue that was largely overlooked was 
the positioning of internal doors.  Most apartments had three interior doors aligned facing each other. Driven 
by the belief that such positioning would bring bad luck, many families at their own expense changed the 
position of at least one door. This issue could have been avoided, if pertinent cultural values had been 
considered as part of the design 16).  
 
In a similar situation following the 2004 tsunami in Aceh-Indonesia and Sri Lanka, many construction 
plans included indoor toilets and kitchens, both of which were considered unhygienic and culturally 
inappropriate, and thus, in many cases indoor kitchens were transformed into storage facilities. Thus in the 
cases of Chennai, Aceh-Indonesia as well as in Sri Lanka, cultural traditions and norms related to the most 
acceptable placement of fundamental housing elements such as walls, doors and windows have been ignored 
44). 
 
The general perception that housing reconstruction is the highest immediate priority for disaster-affected 
communities is not always true, and even in the most catastrophically affected areas, communities may not 
accept houses that do not meet their socio-cultural and economic needs. A case study into a reconstruction 
project in Colombia 20) revealed that the building of infrastructure such as sanitation networks, roads, small 
industries and production facilities had greater priority for the community than rebuilding of their houses. In 
many cases affected communities invested a larger portion of their assets and aid money into fixing damaged 
infrastructure. A relatively large body of literature suggests that affected communities either refuse to accept 
houses, or abandon them after occupancy, basically because the designs and physical provisions do not 
respond to their basic needs 18). For example in Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Yemen, Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka many families abandoned their houses because they did not cater for the basic 
living conditions of the occupant beneficiaries, such as provision of potable water and need for proximity to 
employment 20; 24; 21). 
 
The earthquake that hit Marathwada region of Western India in 1993 caused immense destruction to the 
traditional vernacular housing. Immediately after the earthquake, a quick damage assessment showed that the 
traditional approach to housing construction was to blame for loss of lives and properties, and as a result, all 
traditional and local housing techniques for a period following this time were scrapped. New housing designs 
were produced and many villages were relocated. However, eight months afterwards major problems started 
to emerge. Firstly, some villages were relocated onto agricultural land that belonged to other villages, and 
other villages lost their land allocation to other villages, or were relocated as far as five kilometres away 
from their original lands; in addition to these losses inflicted upon the affected communities, the new housing 
designs and development spatial planning did not consider the villagers’ way of life. Instead of narrow 
traditional streets and open spaces for religious and other public activities, a city style plan with large streets 
and linear rows of housing was designed leaving no space for numerous important traditional activities. 
Furthermore, the new villages were far bigger in size than the old ones, making it financially impossible for 
the villagers to sustain the resultant enlarged infrastructure which the government had provided. As a result, 
many villagers decided to leave these relocated villages and return to their previous sites, re-employing their 
traditional techniques of building and planning; however, techniques to make these preferred traditional 
houses more resistant to potential earthquakes were not incorporated 36).  
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper outlines and discusses five common factors that often impact on the outcomes of post-disaster 
housing reconstruction projects. The paper examines case studies of failed reconstruction projects across the 
world. The findings reveal that in the majority of post-disaster housing reconstruction projects already 
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implemented, failure can be linked-back to lack of, or problems with, community participation, relocation 
issues, fraudulent use and waste of project funds, and ignoring local needs and culture. 
 
Reconstruction projects that are poorly designed and do not respond to community socio-cultural and 
economic needs are most likely to either undergo massive modification by the affected recipients, or fail in-
part, or even entirely, to meet their objectives. Housing reconstruction is not often the highest immediate 
priority for disaster-affected communities, and regardless of the effects of the disaster, communities will not 
accept donations of houses that do not meet their socio-cultural and economic needs 50; 24). Understanding the 
complexity and the nature of post-disaster reconstruction projects also necessitates sponsors of these projects 
to shift their perception from merely seeing housing reconstruction projects as a response to the resultant 
immediate emergency, to providing assistance that responds to the long term strategic needs of the affected 
populations.   
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